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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Dunn appeals from the district court's order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule
35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion and, because the motion was filed within fourteen days
of the entry of his Judgment of Conviction, his appeal is also timely from his Judgment
of Conviction.

On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in admitting

impermissible I.RE. 404(b) evidence in the form of the testimony of C.R. and Detectives
Lawrence and McKenna as the probative value of this evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

He also asserts that the court

erroneously admitted a portion of the testimony of Detective McKenna, discussing a
conversation that he had with Mr. Dunn regarding prior sexual misconduct with C.R.,
because it was not presented for the limited purpose of showing that Mr. Dunn had
admitted to previously abusing C.R., but for another purpose, to characterize Mr. Dunn
as a liar.

Mr. Dunn asserts that even if these errors are found to be harmless

individually, that the accumulation of errors necessitates a reversal of his convictions.
Alternatively, Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his
case which requires the vacation of his Judgment of Conviction or the Order Denying
Motion on his Rule 35 motion.

During the sentencing hearing and at the Rule 35

hearing, the prosecution committed misconduct when it discussed Mr. Dunn's refusal to
participate in a psychosexual evaluation as an aggravating circumstance.

This

misconduct resulted in Mr. Dunn being denied due process of law and amounted to a
violation of his right to refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, rights that are
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
and Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Although defense counsel did not object to
1

these instances of misconduct, Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct
amounted to fundamental error and was not harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of ProceedinQs
On December 20, 2012, an Information was filed charging Mr. Dunn with three
counts of lewd conduct and with a repeat sexual offender sentencing enhancement.
(R., pp.55-58.) The charges were the result of a report to police that Mr. Dunn had
been inappropriately touching S.E. and A.D.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Mr. Dunn entered not guilty pleas to the charges. (R., pp.5960.)
The State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility
of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, evidence that Mr. Dunn had previously molested other
children.

(R., pp.67-68.)

Specifically, the State sought to introduce testimony that

Mr. Dunn had abused his daughters, C.R. 1 and B.J. (R., p.79.) The State asserted that
there were similarities between the conduct with C.R. and the three alleged victims:
Mr. Dunn was a father figure to all involved and the alleged sexual touching was similar
to that of the touching of C.R. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.24, L.9 - p.26, L.16.) Defense counsel
argued that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial
effect. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.30, Ls.20-24, p.35, Ls.8-11.) The district court specifically found
that the evidence was relevant under I.RE. 404(b) to show a common plan or scheme.
(Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, Ls.20-23.) However, the district court did not address the prejudicial

1

C.R. is also referred to as C.D. at different times throughout the case. Although she is
now an adult, because she was a victim as a child, only her initials will be used to
identify her in this Appellant's Brief.
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effect of admitting the LR. E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.55, L.3 - p.64, L.9.) The
case proceeded to trial. (R., p.115.)
At trial, the State presented the testimony of all three alleged victims.

S.E.

testified that Mr. Dunn was a grandfather/father figure to her and that from the ages of
six through thirteen he touched her in a sexual manner: hand to vagina and mouth to
vagina. (Tr. Trial 1, p.9, Ls.16-19, p.20, L.8 - p.22, L.11, p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.6, p.87,
Ls.2-9, p.107, L.21 - p.108, L.18.)2 A.O. testified that Mr. Dunn was stepfather/father
figure to her and that from fifth grade until she was fourteen, he touched her in a sexual
manner: hand to vagina and mouth to vagina. (Tr. Trial 1, p.132, Ls.8-11, p.155, Ls.1322, p.157, L.11 -p.158, L.10, p.167, Ls.13-14.) M.T. testified that her father was not
always present in her life and that Mr. Dunn filled that role in her life. (Tr. Trial 1, p.201,
L.20 - p.202, L.22.) She also testified that Mr. Dunn molested her for four years by
touching her vagina with his hands, and that the last touching occurred in the summer of
2011. (Tr. Trial 1, p.203, Ls.6-22.)
Prior to C.R. testifying, defense counsel renewed his objections to the
presentation of C.R.'s testimony. (Tr. Trial 1, p.237, Ls.10-25.) The State reiterated
that the evidence was relevant because of the similar relationships - Mr. Dunn being a
father figure to S.E., A.O., and M.T. and being the father of C.R. - and the similarities
between the charged conduct and the prior conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.818.) The prosecution also noted that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. (Tr. Trial
1, p.238, Ls.20-23.) Ultimately, the court found that the evidence was relevant to prove

2

The transcript of the trial is broken into two separate transcripts. For ease of
reference, the transcript of the testimony at trial will be cited as Tr. Trial 1. The
transcript of the vior dire, opening and closing arguments, return of jury verdict, and
post-verdict activities will be cited as Tr. Trial 2.
3

a common plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-8.)
C.R. testified that she is the daughter of Mr. Dunn. (Tr. Trial 1, p.249, Ls.4-8.)
When she was eleven to twelve years old, Mr. Dunn placed his mouth on her vagina.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.250, Ls.1-16.)

She specifically remembered this occurring on two

occasions, although she believed it happened on additional occasions.

(Tr. Trial 1,

p.250, Ls.4-8.) Following her testimony, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.257, L.18 - p.258, L.9.)
The State then called Detective Brent Lawrence, the officer that investigated the
charges involving C.R. back in 1995. (Tr. Trial 1, p.260, L.12 - p.262, L.20.) Detective
Lawrence testified that he had spoken to Mr. Dunn at the time, and that he admitted to
touching C.R.'s vagina with his hands and mouth on a couple of occasions. (Tr. Trial 1,
p.262, L.15 - p.264, L.12.)
The State also presented the testimony of Detective Patrick McKenna, the
detective who investigated the charges in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.317, L.13 p.321, L.21.)

Detective McKenna testified about an interview he conducted with

Mr. Dunn in which Mr. Dunn discussed the incident with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.341, L.4 p.344, L.16.)

In response to a question, the detective testified that Mr. Dunn had

claimed that his criminal conduct was an isolated incident that occurred on one
occasion for about a minute and a half. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.6-10.) Defense counsel
then objected.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.11-16.) The court sustained the objection and

asked the jury to disregard the response.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.343, L.25 - p.344, L.2.)

Detective McKenna was then asked if the statement made by Mr. Dunn in the interview
was different than the statements he made to Detective Lawrence in 1995 and he
4

responded that it was. (Tr. Trial ·1, p.344, Ls.9-11.) Defense counsel again objected.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.12-13.) The objection was overruled by the court and the jury was
allowed to consider the answer. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.14-15.)
Mr. Dunn testified on his own behalf. (Tr. Trial 1, p.417, Ls.17-22.) Although he
admitted that he had been convicted of lewd conduct for his actions with C.R., he

maintained his innocence as to the pending charges and specifically denied committing
the acts he was charged with. (Tr. Trial 1, p.419, Ls.4-17, p.452, L.20 - p.453, L. 12.)

The jury found Mr. Dunn guilty of each of the three lewd conduct charges.
(R., p.153.)

Following the return of the jury verdict, Mr. Dunn pied guilty being a

persistent sexual offender. (Tr. Trial 2, p.202, L.6 - p.203, L.11.)

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct

when he encouraged the district court to punish Mr. Dunn for exercising his
constitutional

rights

by

refusing

to

(Tr. 2/10/14, p.18, L.15 - p.20, L.24.)

participate

in

a

psychosexual

evaluation.

The State requested imposition of fixed life

sentences. (Tr. 2/10/14, p.23, Ls.18-19.) Defense counsel recommended a fixed 15
year sentence.

(Tr. 2/10/14, p.27, Ls.22-23.)

Mr. Dunn was sentenced to three

concurrent fixed life sentences. (R., pp.164-165.)
Mr. Dunn filed a Rule 35 motion within 14 days of the filing of the Judgment of
Conviction.

(R., p.167.)

At the Rule 35 hearing, the prosecutor again presented

improper argument erroneously encouraging the district court to consider the
defendant's refusal to participate in a psychosexual evaluation as aggravating evidence.
(Tr. 4/7/14, p.7, L.25 - p.9, L.5.) The motion was denied. (R., p.172.) Mr. Dunn filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the Order Denying Motion. (R., pp.174-178.)

5

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that
was unfairly prejudicial?

2.

Did the district court err in allowing the State to present evidence regarding a
statement Mr. Dunn made to Detective McKenna that showed Mr. Dunn had
minimized or lied to the detective about his prior conduct with C.R., as this
evidence exceeded the scope of the pretrial order allowing only limited I.R.E.
404(b) evidence?

3.

Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Dunn of his right to a fair trial?

4.

Did the State violate Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights when it committed
prosecutorial misconduct at the sentencing and Rule 35 hearings?

6

ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting LR.E. 404(b) Evidence That Was
Unfairly Prejudicial

A

Introduction

Mr. Dunn asserts that the district court erred in admitting irnpermissible Idaho
Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence in the form of the testimony of C.R. and Detectives
Lawrence and McKenna, who testified about statements Mr. Dunn made to them
regarding the sexual abuse of C.R. He asserts that the probative value of this evidence
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

B.

Applicable Jurisprudence
Idaho appellate Courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a

lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho
882, 888 (2004). Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to show a defendant's criminal propensity. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,
667 (2010).

"It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident," if the prosecution has provided notice that it intends to produce the
evidence. Id.; I.RE. 404(b). Yet, under I.RE. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded
"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."

State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000).
In determining whether I.RE. 404(b) evidence was properly admitted, the
appellate court employs a two-step analysis, determining: (1) whether, under

I.RE. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the
7

defendant's character or criminal propensity; and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the
district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Johnson,
148 Idaho at 667 (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999)).

However,

"evidence of a person's actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate issue
for trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho
114,119 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State

v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948,950 (Ct. App.

1990). Determinations of relevancy involve an issue of law and are reviewed de nova.

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501 (1999); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 218 (Ct.
App. 2009). When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence
is not outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

Relevant Factual Information
Prior to trial, the State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pre-trial ruling on the

admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, evidence that Mr. Dunn had previously molested
other children. (R., pp.67-68.) Specifically, the State sought to introduce testimony that
Mr. Dunn had abused his daughters, C.R. and B.J. (R., p.79.) In the Memorandum in
Support of State's Motion in Limine, the State asserted the evidence was admissible for
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake of accident. (R., p.78.) The State also asserted that the evidence showed a
common plan because the alleged victims were "of similar ages or that he had a similar
relationship with them" and that the sexual acts were committed in similar ways.
(R., pp.78-86.)

8

At the !.RE. 404(b) hearing, the State presented the testimony of Detective
Lawrence, the officer that worked on the 1995 case involving allegations that Mr. Dunn
had sexually abused C.R. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.10, L.23 - p.16, L.3.) During his testimony, a

1995 police report that included a report that Mr. Dunn had admitted to engaging in lewd
conduct with C.R. was admitted as an exhibit. (Motion in Umine, State's Exhibit 1.) The
State also presented the testimony of Detective McKenna, the detective investigating
the current charges, who testified that Mr. Dunn had admitted to committing lewd
conduct with C.R. and to have a conviction for his actions. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.17, L.3 - p.18,
L.22.)

Finally, the State presented the testimony of another alleged victim, B.J. 3

(Tr. 7/8/13, p.23, Ls.2-5.)
The State asserted that there were similarities between the conduct with C.R.
and the three alleged victims:

Mr. Dunn was a father figure to all involved and the

alleged sexual touching was similar to that of the touching of C.R. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.24, L.9
- p.26, L.16.) Defense counsel argued that the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

(Tr. 7/8/13, p.30, Ls.20-24, p.35, Ls.8-11.)

In

ruling that the evidence was admissible, the district court noted the special fatherly
relationship that Mr. Dunn had, or had cultivated, with both C.R. and the alleged victims
in the case at hand, that the conduct was of a similar nature, and that the alleged
victims were all near the same ages. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.61, L.10-p.63, L.20.) The district
court specifically found that the evidence was relevant under I.RE. 404(b) to show a
common plan or scheme. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, Ls.20-23.) However, the district court did

3

The district court found that the testimony of B.J. was inadmissible under I.RE. 404(b).
(R, p.89.)
9

not address the prejudicial effect of the admittance of the LR.E. 404(b) evidence.
(Tr. 8/15/13, p.55, L.3 - p.64, L.9.)
Defense counsel conceded that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was proven as a fact.
(Tr. 7/8/13, p.33, Ls.2-14.)

Although defense counsel asserted that the proffered

evidence was not admissible under LR.E. 404(b), counsel conceded that the evidence
may be admissible to prove opportunity, intent, preparation, and plan. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.33,
Ls.22 - p.35, L.8.)
At trial, the LR.E. 404(b) evidence was mentioned early by the prosecution. In

voir dire, the prosecution mentioned that the jury would hear evidence that Mr. Dunn
had sexually abused a child about 18 years earlier. 4 (Tr. Trial 2, p.70, Ls.9-12, p.71,
Ls.14-18, p.73, Ls.10-15.) In its opening statement, the prosecution noted that the jury
would hear from C.R. (Tr. Trial 2, p.120, Ls.16-18.) The prosecution informed the jury
that the purpose of hearing her testimony was to "draw the similarities" between the
alleged conduct with the three alleged victims and conduct toward C.R. and to show the
"type of drive this defendant has." (Tr. Trial 2, p.120, Ls.18-22.)
During the State's case in chief, the State presented the testimony of all three
alleged victims.

S.E. testified that Mr. Dunn was a grandfather/father figure to her.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.9, Ls.16-19.)

At the age of six, Mr. Dunn began touching her

inappropriately by touching her vaginal area with his hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.20, L.8 - p.22,
L.11.) She also testified that Mr. Dunn would put his mouth on her vagina and that he
tried to make her touch his penis on one occasion. (Tr. Trial 1, p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.6.)
The touching continued until she was thirteen years old.

4

(Tr. Trial 1, p.87, Ls.2-9,

In response to this information being provided to the jury, defense counsel then
discussed the previous sexual abuse and informed the jury that Mr. Dunn had been
convicted and served his sentence. (Tr. Trial 2, p.85, Ls.7-20.)
10

p.107, L.21 - p.108, L.18.) A.O. testified that Mr. Dunn was stepfather/father figure to
her. (Tr. Trial 1, p.132, Ls.8-11.) She discussed that he had touched her vagina with
his hands and his mouth.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.155, Ls.13-22.) She also stated that on a

couple of occasions he made her touch his penis. (Tr. Trial 1, p.156, Ls.12-23.) The
touching began when she was in the fifth grade and lasted until December of 2011,
when she was fourteen. (Tr. Trial 1, p.157, L.11 - p.158, L.10, p.167, Ls.13-14.) M.T.
testified that her father was not always present in her life and that Mr. Dunn filled that
role in her life.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.201, L.20 - p.202, L.22.) M.T. testified that Mr. Dunn

molested her for four years by touching her vagina with his hands, and that the last
touching occurred in the summer of 2011. (Tr. Trial 1, p.203, Ls.6-22.)
Prior to C.R. testifying, defense counsel renewed his objections to the
presentation of C.R.'s testimony noting that it was in violation of I.R.E. 404(b), the
United States and Idaho Constitutions, and that even if the evidence was admissible
under I.R.E. 404(b), its probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.237, Ls.10-25.)

The State reiterated that the evidence was relevant

because of the similar relationships - Mr. Dunn being a father figure to S.E., A.O., and
M.T. and being the father of C.R. - and the similarities between the charged conduct
and the prior conduct with C.R.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.8-18.) The prosecution also

noted that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.20-23.) The
district court reiterated its ruling noting that the circumstances of the prior conduct had
been proven to be fact, that the evidence "falls within the common plan that each of
these witnesses independently testified that he played the role of father," "presents a
common plan or a common scheme," that the acts are similar, the alleged victims are
similarly aged, and the circumstances are very similar. (Tr. Trial 1, p.245, L.21 - p.246,
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L.19.) Ultimately, the court noted that the evidence was relevant to prove a common
plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake.

(Tr. Trial 1,

p.247, Ls.2-8.)
C.R. testified that she is the daughter of Mr. Dunn. (Tr. Trial 1, p.249, Ls.4-8.)
When she was eleven to twelve years old, Mr. Dunn placed his mouth on her vagina.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.250, Ls.1-16.)

She specifically remembered this occurring on two

occasions, although she believed it happened on additional occasions.

(Tr. Trial 1,

p.250, Ls.4-8.) Following her testimony, the jury was instructed that:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the
defendant committed crimes, wrongs, or acts other than that for which the
defendant is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by
you to prove the defendant's character or that the defendant has a
disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence may be considered by you
only for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake of
accident.
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. At the time
this evidence was admitted, this Court now wants you to not consider the
evidence by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which
it was admitted. Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except
the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.257, L.18 - p.258, L.9.) It was also brought to the juror's attention that the
next witness would be testifying for the same purpose. (Tr. Trial 1, p.258, Ls.11-24.)
The State then called Detective Brent Lawrence, the officer that investigated the
charges involving C.R. back in 1995. (Tr. Trial 1, p.260, L.12 - p.262, L.20.) Detective
Lawrence testified that he had spoken to Mr. Dunn at the time and that he admitted to
touching C.R.'s vagina with his hands and mouth on a couple of occasions. (Tr. Trial 1,
p.262, L.15-p.264, L.12.)
The State also presented the testimony of Detective Patrick McKenna, the
detective who investigated the charges in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.317, L.13 12

p.321, L.21.)

After testifying about his investigation in the case at hand, Detective

McKenna testified about an interview he conducted with Mr. Dunn in which Mr. Dunn
discussed the incident with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.341, L.4 - p.344, L.16.)
Following the close of evidence, the district court again provided the jury with
limiting instructions. 5 (R., pp.146-147.) Defense counsel objected to this instruction as
part of a continuing objection to the I.RE. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. Trial 2, p.140, Ls.9-19.)

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Rule 404(b) Evidence That
Was Unfairly Prejudicial

1.

Relevancy

Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009)
(citation omitted.). In order to make this determination, "the trial court must determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." Id.
(citations omitted.)

"The trial court must then determine whether the other crime or

wrong is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other
than propensity." Id. (citations omitted.)

a.

Offer Of Proof

Defense counsel conceded that the I.RE. 404(b) evidence was proven as a fact.
(Tr. 7/8/13, p.33, Ls.2-14.) As such, Mr. Dunn does not challenge this finding in this
appeal.

5

The instructions where the same as or similar to those read to the jury
contemporaneously with the admittance of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.146147.)
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b.
"Evidence

Relevance For A Non-Propensity Pur, ose
of uncharged

misconduct may not

be admitted

pursuant to

I.R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Grist, 14 7 Idaho
at 52. Evidence of uncharged bad acts is admissible if relevant to a material issue such
as motive, intent, mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, and identity. State v.

Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1986); See also LR.E. 404(b).
The district court specifically found that the evidence was relevant under
LR.E. 404(b) to show a common plan or scheme. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, Ls.20-23.) During
trial, the district court reiterated its ruling and noted that the evidence was relevant to
prove a common plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-8.)

Although defense counsel asserted that the proffered

evidence was not admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) counsel conceded that the evidence
may be admissible to prove opportunity, intent, preparation, and plan. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.33,
Ls.22 - p.35, L.8.) Accordingly, Mr. Dunn is unable to challenge the admittance of the
evidence on relevancy grounds. 6

2.

The Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Evidence Was More
Prejudicial Than Probative

In the case at hand, defense counsel repeatedly addressed the overly prejudicial
nature of the proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.30, Ls.20-24, p.35, Ls.811; Tr. Trial 1, p.237, Ls.10-25.) However, the district court did not ever address the

6

Despite trial counsel's concession, Mr. Dunn asserts that the evidence was not
actually admissible for a non-propensity purpose and reserves the right to challenge the
concession as constituting ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction, should
such filing be necessary.
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prejudicial effect of admitting the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.55, L.3 - p.64,
L.9; Tr. Trial 1, p.239, L.16 - p.247, L.13.)
"[T]he Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of a// evidence in the
courts of this State."

State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010), (quoting State v.

Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (emphasis in original)). To exclude evidence under

I.R.E. 403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially
outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule.

Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471

(quoting Meister, 148 Idaho at 241 ).
The district court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to address whether
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial
effect. Mr. Dunn asserts that on this basis alone, his case must be remanded for a new
trial.
Alternatively, he asserts that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was unfairly prejudicial
and that the evidence should have been excluded under I.RE. 403. Under I.RE. 403,
relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, inter a/ia, the probative value
of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the evidence would involve needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254 (1995). To
some extent all probative evidence is prejudicial.

State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88

(Ct. App. 1989). The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it harms the
defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict regardless
of other facts presented. Id.
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While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this
discretion is not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard:
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other
crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference
that [the] accused is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime,
must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite
direction, empowering the judge to exclude other-crimes evidence, even
when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its
probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only
leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of
balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on
appeal as an abuse of discretion.
State

OF

V.

Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537 (Ct. App. 1983), (quoting McCORMICK, HANDBOOK

THE LAW ON EVIDENCE

§ 190 (Cleary ed. 1972). Additionally, as with all matters of

discretion on the part of the district court, the court's determination of whether the
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudice must comport
with applicable legal standards. See, e.g., Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 70 (2007)
(finding an abuse of discretion when the district court's action was not consistent with
applicable legal standards).
In this case, assuming that the evidence is relevant, it was highly prejudicial.
Allowing the detectives to testify, permitted the presentation cumulative evidence that
further increased the prejudicial nature of the 404(b) evidence. Prior sexual misconduct
evidence is undeniably, highly prejudicial in general. As Justice Bistline wrote in Moore:
Balancing the prejudice against the probative value is especially vital in
sex abuse cases where the possibility for unfair prejudice is at its
highest.
Once the accused has been characterized as a person of abnormal bent,
driven by biological inclination, it seems relatively easy to arrive at the
conclusion that he must be guilty, he could not help but be otherwise.

16

State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 748 (1991) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(quoting Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 iowA L. REV. 325, 333-34
(1956)).
Although Mr. Dunn cannot challenge whether the I.RE. 404(b) testimony is
relevant on appeal, he asseiis that the probative value is very low. The I.RE. 404(b)
evidence presented in this case was overly prejudicial and the prejudicial effect
outweighs the limited probative value.

Mr. Dunn was charged with engaging in the

criminal molestation of three minors to whom he was a father figure. The I.RE. 404(b)
evidence involved the molestation of Mr. Dunn's daughter in the mid-1990s.

As

discussed by Justice Bistline, evidence that a person has engaged in prior sexually
deviant acts is prejudicial in and of itself.

However, in the case at hand, unlike the

standard presentation of I.RE 404(b) evidence, the jury was allowed to hear about the
incident involving C.R. through three witnesses.

The State presented testimony of

seven witnesses in total. (See generally Tr. Trial 1.) Three of the seven witnesses'
testimony focused, at least in part, on the events of the 1990s molestation of C.R. As a
result, this evidence highlighted the events involving C.R. more than was necessary to
serve the purpose of I.R.E. 404(b). The State unnecessarily presented the testimony of
the detectives to bolster the testimony of C.R. and created an atmosphere of prejudice
far more unfair than a typical case where this type of evidence is admitted.
Not only was the evidence overly highlighted in the presentation of the case in
chief, it was brought to the attention of the jury before the jury had even been selected.
During voir dire, the prosecution informed the jury that the purpose of hearing C.R.
testimony was to "draw the similarities" between the alleged conduct with the three
alleged victims and conduct toward C.R. and to show the "type of drive this defendant
17

has."

(Tr. Trial 2, p.120, Ls.18-22.) In fact, the State's argument that the evidence

would be presented to show the defendant's "drive" and the "similarities" of the abuse
was tantamount to informing the jury that because Mr. Dunn had sexually abused his
C.R. he must have also abused the alleged victims.

This is precisely the type

propensity that is not permitted under I.R.E. 404(b).
Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an unjust
influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: (1) a
presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or (2) an
opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the charged
crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. State v. Wood,
126 Idaho 241, 244-45 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence) is
that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime
on trial because he is a man of criminal character." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)). Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of

character evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have
acted consistently with those past acts or traits. Id.
Where a significant portion of the trial focused on the prior bad acts of Mr. Dunn
and the jury was conditioned to consider the evidence for an impermissible propensity
purpose during vior dire, the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its probative
value. Furthermore, this was a case where there was no physical evidence introduced.
The jury was forced to believe either Mr. Dunn's assertions of innocence or the
assertions of his accusers. In a case where credibility is a central issue, this type of
evidence could easily interfere with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision.
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Simply, the jury was overwhelmed with evidence of uncharged conduct;
undoubtedly, it considered Mr. Dunn to be a man of criminal character.

In a type of

case where the danger of unfair prejudice is very high, and the jury heard witness after
witness describe uncharged conduct, the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exclude the evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403.

E.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admitting The Evidence Was Harmless
Error
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: "To hold an error as

harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
In this instance, because the error was objected to, it is the State's burden to
prove that the admittance of the evidence did not contribute to the conviction. Mr. Dunn
maintains that the error was not harmless because the prejudicial effect of the jury
improperly hearing the I.RE. 404(b) evidence may have influenced the jury's ability to
be impartial despite jury instructions attempting to limit the purpose for which the jury
considered the evidence.
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11.
The District Court Erred In Allowin The State To Present Evidence Re ardin A
Statement Mr. Dunn Made To Detective McKenna, That Showed Mr. Dunn Had
Minimized Or Lied To The Detective About His Prior Conduct With C.R., As This
Evidence Fxceeded The Scope Of The Pretrial Order Allowing Only I imited I.R.E.
404(b) Evidence

A.

Introduction
The State introduced the testimony of Detective McKenna, in part, to discuss a

conversation that he had with Mr. Dunn regarding prior sexual misconduct with C.R.
However, the testimony was not presented for the limited purpose of showing that
Mr. Dunn had admitted to previously abusing C.R., but for another purpose, to
characterize Mr. Dunn as a liar.

The admissibility of this evidence of lying was not

addressed pretrial and it was error for the district court to admit the evidence.

B.

Applicable Jurisprudence

The standards of review and general law pertaining to 1.R.E. 404(b) and
I.R.E. 403 are cited in section l(B) above and are incorporated herein by reference.

C.

Relevant Factual Information
The State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility

of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, evidence that Mr. Dunn had previously molested other
children.

(R., pp.67-68.)

Specifically, the State sought to introduce testimony that

Mr. Dunn had abused his daughter, C.R. (R., p.79.) In the Memorandum in Support of
State's Motion in Limine, the State asserted the evidence was admissible for proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
of accident. (R., p. 78.) The State also asserted that the evidence showed a common
plan because the alleged victims were "of similar ages or that he had a similar
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relationship with them" and that the sexual acts were committed in similar ways.
(R., pp.78-86.)
At the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing, the State presented the testimony of Detective
McKenna, the detective investigating the current charges, who testified that Mr. Dunn
had admitted to committing lewd conduct with C.R. and to have a conviction for his
actions. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.17, L.3 - p.18, L.22.) The State again asserted that there were
similarities between the conduct with C.R. and the three alleged victims. (Tr. 7/8/13,
p.24, L.9 - p.26, L.16.) The district court specifically found that the evidence was
relevant under I.R.E. 404(b) to show a common plan or scheme. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.63,
Ls.20-23.)
Prior to C.R. testifying, defense counsel renewed his objections to the
presentation of C.R.'s testimony. (Tr. Trial 1, p.237, ls.10-25.) The State reiterated
that the evidence was relevant because of the similar relationships and the similarities
between the charged conduct and the prior conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.818.) The district court noted that the evidence was relevant to prove a common plan or
scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake. (Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.28.)

At trial, the State presented the testimony of Detective McKenna, the detective
who investigated the charges in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.317, L.13 - p.321,
L.21.) After testifying about his investigation in the case at hand, Detective McKenna
testified about an interview he conducted with Mr. Dunn in which Mr. Dunn discussed
the incident with C.R.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.341, L.4 - p.344, L.16.) Prior to his testimony

about this specific portion of the interrogation, the jury was again provided a limiting
instruction. (Tr. Trial 1, p.340, Ls.12-23.)
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At the beginning of Detective McKenna's testimony regarding the incident with
C.R., defense counsel objected on a cumulative basis.

(Tr. Trial 1, p.341, Ls.4-22.)

The State argued that the evidence would be different than what the jury had heard
before, "we're also going to draw some inconsistencies in the statements, which would
be for impeachment purposes."

(Tr. Trial 1, p.342, Ls.2-4.) The court allowed the

testimony. (Tr. Trial 1, p.342, L.10.) Detective McKenna testified that Mr. Dunn told him
he had been convicted of fondling and having oral sex with his daughter, C.R. (Tr. Trial
1, p.342, Ls.14-19.) In response to a question, the detective then testified that Mr. Dunn
had claimed that his criminal conduct was an isolated incident that occurred on one
occasion for about a minute and a half. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.6-10.) Defense counsel
then objected, asserting that the answer was beyond the scope of the allowed 404(b)
testimony and beyond the scope of the limiting instruction. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.11-16.)
The court sustained the objection and asked the jury to disregard the response.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.343, L.25 - p.344, L.2.) In response to a question from the State, the
district court noted it was granting the objection because it was premature to introduce
the statement as impeachment. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.3-7.) Detective McKenna was
then asked if the statement made by Mr. Dunn in the interview was different than the
statements he made to Detective Lawrence in 1995, and he responded that it was.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.9-11.) Defense counsel again objected on the same grounds.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.12-13.) The objection was overruled and the jury was allowed to
consider the answer. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.14-15.)
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D.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Present Evidence Regardin9_6
Statement Made To Detective McKenna By Mr. Dunn, That Showed Mr. Dunn
Had Minimized Or Lied To The Detective About His Prior Conduct With C.R., As
This Evidence Exceeded The Scope Of The Pretrial Order Allowing Only Limited
I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence
Mr. Dunn acknowledges that the district court initially struck the erroneous

testimony. However, he asserts it was error for the district court to allow the follow-up
question and answer in which Detective McKenna said that Mr. Dunn had made
different statements in his more recent interview than when he was interviewed in 1995.
This evidence was outside the scope of the permitted LR.E. 404(b) evidence and was
either new, inadmissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, impermissible character evidence, or
improper impeachment.

1.

The Evidence Was Outside The Scope Of The Pretrial Order Allowing
Limited I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence

The State did not offer evidence of Mr. Dunn's minimization or lie about his prior
criminal conduct involving C.R. merely to show that Mr. Dunn had sexually abused C.R.
If that was the intended purpose, the State could have stopped its questioning after
establishing that Mr. Dunn admitted to Detective McKenna that he had molested C.R.
Instead, the State continued to question Detective McKenna for the express purpose of
soliciting information that implied Mr. Dunn had minimized or lied about his conduct with
C.R.; "we're also going to draw some inconsistencies in the statements." (Tr. Trial 1,
p.342, Ls.2-4.)
The evidence was clearly outside the scope of the pretrial ruling allowing specific
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that Mr. Dunn had engaged in sexual acts with C.R. for the
purposes of proving a common plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and
absence of mistake. (Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-8.) As such, the State sought admission of
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this specific evidence for an impermissible purpose

to prove that Mr. Dunn had lied to

Detective McKenna.

2.

The Evidence Was Not Admissible I.RE. 404(b) Evidence

Mr. Dunn's alleged actions of minimizing or lying about his sexual contact with
C.R. is a prior bad act for which the State did not provide specific notice. Additionally,
the State did not prove that this minimization was admissible for any of the purposes
articulated in I.R.E. 404(b).

a.

Relevance For A Non-Pro

Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).
'The trial court must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a
material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id.
(citations omitted.)

Evidence of uncharged bad acts is admissible if relevant to a

material issue such as motive, intent, mistake or accident, common scheme or plan,
and identity. State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1986); See also I.RE.
404(b).
The district court was not provided an opportunity to specifically determine
whether or not Mr. Dunn actually made a statement to Detective McKenna that was
different than the statements made in 1995. Additionally, the district court did not find
that the minimization or lying evidence was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) for any of the
articulated purposes because it was never requested to do so pretrial.
The evidence is not admissible because it is not relevant to a material issue.
Whether or not Mr. Dunn lied to police about the full extent of his conduct in 1995 with
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C.R. is not relevant to the ultimate question of his guilt or innocence of the charged
crimes. Further, it in no way is relevant to show a motive, intent, mistake or accident,
common scheme or plan, or identity. Instead, this evidence was offered only to show
that Mr. Dunn has a propensity to lie. Such propensity evidence in inadmissible under
LR.E. 404(b).

b.

The Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Evidence Was More
Pre/udicial Than Probative

Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, inter

alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the
evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia,
127 Idaho 249, 254 ( 1995). The evidence that Mr. Dunn had minimized or lied about
his conduct with C.R. during an investigation for engaging in sexual conduct with three
minors is highly prejudicial. This is a case where there is no physical evidence to prove
the alleged conduct. Instead, the case hinges on a credibility determination. The jury
must either believe Mr. Dunn or his accusers. Information that shows Mr. Dunn to be a
liar is likely to weigh heavily on the jury's credibility determination. As such, the district
court abused its discretion by failing to exclude the evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403.

3.

The Evidence Is Inadmissible Character Evidence

The evidence was clearly outside the scope of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence found
admissible by the district court and was not admissible as new or additional
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. The evidence is also inadmissible under the alternative theory
that it is character evidence.

I.R.E. 608 states, in relevant portions, that:
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(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion
or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ...
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the
witness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of
the court, if probative of ... untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the witness for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
LR.E. 608.
The State sought to introduce evidence that on a specific occasion Mr. Dunn lied
or minimized his criminal conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, L.6 - p.344, L.15.) This
evidence is clearly inadmissible character evidence under I.RE. 608.

As such,

evidence of this specific instance of conduct is also not admissible character evidence.

4.

The Evidence Is Inadmissible Impeachment Evidence

During trial, the State asserted that the evidence was impeachment evidence.
(Tr. Trial 1, p.342, Ls.2-4.) Initially, in striking the first improper question and answer,
the district court noted that it was premature to introduce the statement as
impeachment. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.3-7.) However, the district court erred in overruling
the objection to the second question and answer.
Impeachment evidence "is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to
reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains
why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. Examples of impeachment
evidence would include prior inconsistent statements ... [andJ ... attacks on [the]
character of a witness ... " State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69 (Ct. App. 2004)
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(quoting Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted)). At
this point in the trial, during the State's presentation of its case in chief, Mr. Dunn had
not testified. (See generally Tr. Trial 1.) The State cannot impeach Mr. Dunn prior to
him testifying. As such, this is not a permissible ground for admitting the evidence.

E.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admitting The Evidence Was Harmless
Error
The harmless error standard was articulated in section l(E) above and is

incorporated herein by reference. Because Mr. Dunn objected to the admission of the
challenged evidence, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (20·10).
In this instance, because the error was objected to, it is the State's burden to
prove that admitting the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.

Mr. Dunn

maintains that the error was not harmless because the prejudicial effect of the jury
improperly hearing the evidence may have influenced the jury's ability to make an
impartial decision regarding Mr. Dunn's credibility. This danger was increased when the
prosecution made impermissible arguments regarding this evidence and the evidence
that was struck immediately prior to this testimony during closing arguments.
During closing argument, the State presented the following argument:
What's his motivation today? So there's 1995. He denied doing this,
admits to it, bull crap, plead guilty, gets in trouble. Gets in trouble in 2011,
what's his motivation at that point? Told Detective McKenna it's a one
time thing, when he talked about this. He admitted Crystal's statement
was correct.
He said two, disputed multiple, he agrees with Detective
And told Detective
Lawrence's account of it being multiple times.
McKenna that there were (inaudible) told McKenna it was a one-time slip.
(Tr. Trial 2, p.165, Ls.8-18.)
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The closing argument by the prosecutor clearly included information that was
struck by the district court. Mr. Dunn asserts that this reference to evidence that the jury
had been told it could not consider was prosecutorial misconduct. 7 Violation of a district
court order governing the presentation of evidence may constitute misconduct. State v.

Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572 (2007).

The district court's ruling was clear and the

prosecutor's total disregard of the order is deliberate misconduct, highlighting for the
jury evidence it had been told specifically not to consider.
Any possibility that the district court's actions in limiting the prejudicial testimony
had reduced the harm to Mr. Dunn was all but removed when the State referenced the
struck evidence.

Due to the nature of the charges, the importance of the jury's

credibility determination, and the inappropriate reference to the excluded testimony, it is
likely that the improperly admitted evidence influenced the jury. As such, the State will
be unable to meet its burden.

111.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Dunn's Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors
Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Dunn asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the
district court's errors combined amount to cumulative error.

The cumulative error

doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the

7

Mr. Dunn does not address the prosecutorial misconduct on appeal as a separate
issue because there was no objection to preserve this issue for appeal. The
misconduct relates to an evidentiary ruling and, as such, is not reviewable under the
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, _ , 334 P.3d 806, 822-23
(2014).
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defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635
(Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that
there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these
errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho
160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed
harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial.

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994 ). However, a finding of cumulative error
must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho
19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Dunn asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to actual
errors depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found
in sections I and II above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by
reference.
IV.
The State Violated Mr. Dunn's Constitutional Rights When It Committed Prosecutorial
Misconduct At The Sentencing And Rule 35 Hearings
A.

Introduction
Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which

requires the vacation of his Judgment of Conviction or the Order Denying Motion on his
Rule 35 motion.

During the sentencing hearing and at the Rule 35 hearing, the

prosecution committed misconduct which rises to the level of fundamental error
because the misconduct was related to one or more of Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights
and was so egregious that it may have contributed to his sentence or the denial of his
Rule 35 motion.

The unfairness created by the prosecutor's misconduct resulted in

Mr. Dunn being denied due process of law and amounted to a violation of his right to
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refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, rights that are guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution.
Although defense counsel did not object to these instances of misconduct,
Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error, was
not harmless and, this Court should vacate his Judgment of Conviction and the Order
Denying Rule 35.

B.

Applicable Jurisprudence
Because

Mr.

Dunn's

prosecutorial

misconduct claims

are grounded

in

constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review.

City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006).

The issues raised by

Mr. Dunn involve un-objected-to misconduct. Because these claims of error are raised

for the first time on appeal, Mr. Dunn must establish that the errors are reviewable as
"fundamental error." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The Idaho Supreme
Court recently revisited fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for
fundamental error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first

show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear,
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry
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test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome. Id. at 226-228.

C.

Relevant Factual Information
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct

when he encouraged the district court to punish Mr. Dunn for exercising his
constitutional rights by refusing to participate in a psychosexual evaluation:
The evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, and to this
day, he continues to not own it, to the point - to the extent that he chooses
to not give this Court mitigating information in a psychosexual evaluation.
The defendant - and he's always got a great excuse. He has a
great excuse to the detective why he didn't take the evaluation. He had a
great excuse for everything he did, including sleeping with the girls and
everything that he admitted to doing. He always had a great excuse for
that.
Oh, he'd take the evaluation, but you can't trust those polygraphs.
Well, to Joe Public, you know that may resonate. You know some people
may buy that but those of us that have done these cases for a long time
and handled these things, that's just simply baloney. We rely on them all
the time.
He's had the opportunity, up against a polygraph, to deny this, and
he chose not to. Why?
As a parent, we would have figured he would have maintained his
innocence. And that's fine. That's certainly his right.
But, again, he was given the opportunity to give this Court some
information.
We've had - I've had defense attorneys not want to give me an
evaluation, and we discussed doing a plea agreement. And then if they
choose not to, we do an agreement. Later on, when we get down to
sentencing and I get the evaluation, and my thought is "well, that's not that
bad," you know, as we compare these different things.
But, you know, he wants to say that these things are based on the
fact it's not going to help him at all. That's just simply not true. The Court
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knows that. He's chosen not to because he knows what will be contained
in that information. He knows what this Court will learn about his risk. He
know what this Court will not just assume or suppose but will realize from
his risk. . .. [W]e have multiple victims not almost 19 years later, he and
he's chosen not to tell us about any - anything about anyone else.
And that begs the question what's the defendant's risk?
(Tr. 2/10/14, p.18, L 15 - p.20, L.24.)
Prior to pronouncing sentence, the district court noted that it "considered the fact
that I have no evidence before me to suggest that you are treatable in the community an
that you do not pose a threat to the community." (Tr. 2/10/14, p.35, Ls.6-9.)
At the Rule 35 hearing, the prosecutor again presented improper argument
erroneously encouraging the district court to consider the defendant's refusal to
participate in a psychosexual evaluation as aggravating evidence:
We discussed at length, at the time of sentencing, and we would
have the opportunity to do that same thing today - the defendant has the
right to alleviate this Court's concerns. The purpose of obtaining a
psychosexual evaluation and doing a polygraph exam is to allow this
Court to put into context or put in perspective this defendant's risk.
And that's the way it should be viewed. Every time I get one of
those evaluations I've got my concern is here, my fear is here, and I get
an evaluation and it kind of moves it around from the [sic] there. The
defendant has the ability and has the right to alleviate this Court's concern
and yet it chooses not to. Instead he chooses to come before the Court
and Beg for a certain amount of leniency and without addressing this
Court's fear.
Now, counsel makes a comment regarding those other police
reports - one of those other health welfare reports, and police reports, and
so forth. The Court understood and, I think, grasped the severity and the
widespread nature of this defendant's conduct. Now again, those bear
allegations could have been easily explained, and frankly, easily
dismissed by Mr. Dunn if he chose to do so, but yet he didn't. He le[f]t this
Court with that concern coupled with what the Court saw was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt regarding three victims here, one prior, as well
as the other daughter. So we've got these acknowledged Counts these
[sic] acknowledged conduct and then we have concern other this other
conduct and yet he chooses to dispel none of it.
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(Tr. 4/7/14, p.7, L.25 - p.9, L.5.)
In orally pronouncing the ruling on the Rule 35 motion, the district court noted

that:
And, as was argued today the Court would like to have an evaluation that
would give me some assessment as to what the likelihood of re-offense
would be, and in this case I don't have that. ... But understanding the
responsibilities that the Court has and applying those to the circumstances
of this case, with this individual, with this history, and without an
assessment as to whether there is a threat, the Court sees no alternative
then to maintain what we've done at sentencing and would deny the Rule
35.
(Tr. 4/7/14, p.11, Ls.1-15.)

D.

The State Violated Mr. Dunn's Constitutional Ri hts When It Committed
Prosecutorial Misconduct At The Sentencin And Rule 35 Hearin s
The prosecution's statements during the sentencing and Rule 35 hearings are

prosecutorial misconduct which infringe upon Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights. While
Mr. Dunn acknowledges that it is proper for the district court to note that it does not
have information about the risk to reoffend, it is not proper for the State to argue that a
defendant's refusal to furnish this information constitutes an aggravating circumstance
that requires a harsher sentence or to opine about the nefarious reasons that a
defendant may have for his refusal.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person
shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.

Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[n]o person
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shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." lo.

CONST.

art. I, §13.

The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does
not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the
nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites." Application of
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967). At the time of sentencing, for purposes of a psychological

evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies.
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563 (2006).

Estrada "held that a psychosexual

evaluation is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution such that the defendant has a ...
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to participate in the evaluation." Murray v. State, 156
Idaho 159, 166 (2014) (citations omitted); see also Estrada, 143 Idaho at 563-65.
In this case, the prosecution's assertions that Mr. Dunn's failure to participate in a
psychosexual evaluation should result in a harsher sentence or the denial of his Rule 35
motion were calculated to encourage the district court to impose a stricter sentence than
it would have otherwise.

These arguments violated Mr. Dunn's rights to refuse to

participate in a psychosexual evaluation and to due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Idaho Constitution. As such, this misconduct directly
implicates Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights and is reviewable for fundamental error.
Mr. Dunn asserts that the misconduct in the case at hand is fundamental. The
error in this case plainly exists from the record and no additional information is
necessary.

It cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a

defendant sentenced, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible
grounds presented through misconduct. It could serve no strategic decision to fail to
object to the prosecutor's impermissible statements about Mr. Dunn's refusal to
34

participate in a psychosexual evaluation.

The law regarding a defendant's right to

refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation and to not have such refusal held
against him is clear and the prosecutor's statements to the contrary are deliberate
misconduct.
!n the present case, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Dunn
his rights to due process of law and to refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation
because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to
the sentence.

Certainly, the district court noted in both hearings that it was lacking

information about a risk to reoffend and that the district court was considering the lack of
information in determining the sentence.

It is evident that the district court was

considered the State's improper argument at the Rule 35 hearing as it noted it "was
argued today the Court would like to have an evaluation that would give me some
assessment as to what the likelihood of re-offense would be, and in this case I don't
have that." (Tr. 4/7/14, p.11, Ls.1-4.) As such, in reviewing the sentencing and Rule 35
hearings,

the

prosecutor's

improper comments,

influenced the district court and the resulting sentence.
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constituting

misconduct,

likely

CONCLUSION
Mr. Dunn respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and
his case remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that his judgment
of conviction be vacated and case be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and his
case be remanded for a new Rule 35 hearing.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2015.

ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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